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Abstract
We present the ﬁrst cryptographically sound security proof of the well-known Otway-Rees protocol.
More precisely, we show that the protocol is secure against arbitrary active attacks including
concurrent protocol runs if it is implemented using provably secure cryptographic primitives. We
prove secrecy of the exchanged keys with respect to the accepted cryptographic deﬁnition of real-
or-random secrecy, i.e., indistinguishability of exchanged keys and random ones, given the view of
a general cryptographic attacker. Although we achieve security under cryptographic deﬁnitions,
our proof is performed in a deterministic setting corresponding to a slightly extended Dolev-Yao
model; in particular, it does not have to deal with probabilistic aspects of cryptography and is
hence in the scope of current proof tools. The reason is that we exploit a recently proposed ideal
cryptographic library, which has a provably secure cryptographic implementation, as well as recent
results on linking symbolic and cryptographic key secrecy. Besides establishing the cryptographic
security of the Otway-Rees protocol, our result also exempliﬁes the potential of this cryptographic
library and the recent secrecy preservation theorem for symbolic yet cryptographically sound proofs
of security.
Keywords: Cryptographic soundness, Otway-Rees, real-or-random secrecy, Dolev-Yau model
1 Introduction
Many practically relevant cryptographic protocols like SSL/TLS, S/MIME,
IPSec, or SET use cryptographic primitives like signature schemes or encryp-
tion in a black-box way, while adding many non-cryptographic features. Vul-
nerabilities have accompanied the design of such protocols ever since early
1 Extended and revised version of [4].
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authentication protocols like Needham-Schroeder [38,20], over carefully de-
signed de-facto standards like SSL and PKCS [44,17], up to current widely
deployed products like Microsoft Passport [22]. However, proving the security
of such protocols has been a very unsatisfactory task for a long time.
One way to conduct such proofs is the cryptographic approach, whose
security deﬁnitions are based on complexity theory, e.g., [24,23,25,14]. The
security of a cryptographic protocol is proved by reduction, i.e., by showing
that breaking the protocol implies breaking one of the underlying crypto-
graphic primitives with respect to its cryptographic deﬁnition. This approach
captures a very comprehensive adversary model and allows for mathematically
rigorous and precise proofs. However, because of probabilism and complexity-
theoretic restrictions, these proofs have to be done by hand so far, which yields
proofs with faults and imperfections. Moreover, such proofs rapidly become
too complex for larger protocols.
The alternative is the formal-methods approach, which is concerned with
the automation of proofs using model checkers and theorem provers. As these
tools currently cannot deal with cryptographic details like error probabilities
and computational restrictions, abstractions of cryptography are used. They
are almost always based on the so-called Dolev-Yao model [21]. This model
simpliﬁes proofs of larger protocols considerably and gave rise to a large body
of literature on analyzing the security of protocols using various techniques
for formal veriﬁcation, e.g., [35,33,29,18,41,1].
Among the protocols typically analyzed in the Dolev-Yao model, the
Otway-Rees protocol [39], which aims at establishing a shared key between two
users by means of a trusted third party, stands out as one of the most promi-
nent protocols. It has been extensively studied in the past, e.g., in [40,28,41],
and various new approaches and formal proof tools for the analysis of secu-
rity protocols were validated by showing that they can prove the protocol in
the Dolev-Yao model (respectively that they can ﬁnd the well-known type-
ﬂaw attack if the underlying model does not provide suﬃcient typing itself;
the model that our proof is based upon excludes this attack). However, all
existing proofs of security of the Otway-Rees protocol are restricted to the
Dolev-Yao model, i.e., no theorem exists which allows for carrying over the
results of an existing proof to the cryptographic approach with its much more
comprehensive adversary. Thus, despite the tremendous amount of research
dedicated to the Otway-Rees protocol, it is still an open question whether an
actual implementation based on provably secure cryptographic primitives is
secure under cryptographic security deﬁnitions. We close this gap by provid-
ing the ﬁrst security proof of the Otway-Rees protocol in the cryptographic
approach. We show that the protocol is secure against arbitrary active attacks
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if the Dolev-Yao-based abstraction of symmetric encryption is implemented
using a symmetric encryption scheme that is secure against chosen-ciphertext
attacks and that additionally ensures integrity of ciphertexts. More precisely,
we prove real-or-random secrecy of the exchanged keys, i.e., we show that no
cryptographic attacker is able to distinguish fresh, random keys and keys that
are actually exchanged between two honest participants unless the underlying
cryptography can be broken. This is the accepted cryptographic deﬁnition
of key secrecy. Moreover, we show consistency of the protocol in that par-
ties that have successfully established a shared key have a consistent view of
who the peers of the sessions are. 2 Chosen-ciphertext security and integrity
of ciphertexts are the standard security deﬁnition of authenticated symmet-
ric encryption schemes [16,15], and eﬃcient symmetric encryptions schemes
provably secure in this sense exist under reasonable assumptions [15,43].
Obviously, establishing a proof in the cryptographic approach presupposes
dealing with the mentioned cryptographic details, hence one naturally assumes
that our proof heavily relies on complexity theory and is far out of scope of
current proof tools. However, our proof is not performed from scratch in
the cryptographic setting, but based on a recently proposed cryptographic
library [10,11,8], which provides cryptographically faithful, deterministic ab-
stractions of cryptographic primitives, i.e., the abstractions can be securely im-
plemented using actual cryptography. Moreover, the library allows for nesting
the abstractions in an arbitrary way, quite similar to the original Dolev-Yao
model. While this was shown for public-key encryption and digital signa-
tures in [10] and subsequently extended with message authentication codes
in [11], the most recent extension of the library further incorporated symmet-
ric encryption [8] which constitutes the most commonly used cryptographic
primitive in the typical proofs with Dolev-Yao models, and also serves as
the central primitive for expressing and analyzing the Otway-Rees protocol.
However, as shown in [8], there are intrinsic diﬃculties in providing a sound
abstraction from symmetric encryption in the strong sense of security used
in [10]. Very roughly, a sound Dolev-Yao-style abstraction of symmetric en-
cryption can only be established if a so-called commitment problem does not
occur, which means that whenever a key that is not known to the adversary is
used for encryption by an honest user then this key will never be revealed to
the adversary. We will elaborate on the origin of this problem in more detail
in the paper. While [8] discusses several solutions to this problem, the one
actually taken is to leave it to the surrounding protocol to guarantee that the
commitment problem does not occur, i.e., if a protocol that uses symmetric
2 A violation of this consistency property has been pointed out in [28] which arises due to
a diﬀerent modeling of the trusted third party. We will discuss this in the following.
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encryption should be faithfully analyzed, it additionally has to be shown that
the protocol guarantees that keys are no longer sent in a form that might
make them known to the adversary once an honest participant has started
using them. Our proof shows that this is a manageable task that can easily be
incorporated in the overall security proof without imposing a major additional
burden on the prover.
Once we have shown that the Otway-Rees protocol does not raise the com-
mitment problem, we prove the security of the Otway-Rees protocol based on
the deterministic abstraction. In combination with a recent result on linking
symbolic and cryptographic key secrecy [9], this allows us to perform a sym-
bolic proof of secrecy for the Otway-Rees protocol and to derive the desired
cryptographic key secrecy from that. Similarly, we establish the consistency
property based on the abstraction and exploit a general integrity preservation
theorem [6] to derive the consistency property for the cryptographic setting.
As the proof is deterministic and rigorous, it should be easily expressible in for-
mal proof tools, in particular theorem provers. Even done by hand, our proof
is much less prone to error than a reduction proof conducted from scratch
in the cryptographic approach. We also want to point out that our result
not only provides the up-to-now missing cryptographic security proof of the
Otway-Rees protocol, but also exempliﬁes the usefulness of the cryptographic
library [10], their extensions [11,8], and the corresponding general theorems
for linking symbolic and cryptographic properties based on this library [6,9]
for the cryptographically sound veriﬁcation of cryptographic protocols.
Further Related Work.
Cryptographic underpinnings of a Dolev-Yao model were ﬁrst addressed
by Abadi and Rogaway in [3]. However, they only handled passive adversaries
and symmetric encryption. The protocol language and security properties
handled were extended in [2,30], but still only for passive adversaries. This
excludes most of the typical ways of attacking protocols, e.g., man-in-the-
middle attacks and attacks by reusing a message part in a diﬀerent place or
a concurrent protocol run. A full cryptographic justiﬁcation for a Dolev-Yao
model, i.e., for arbitrary active attacks and within arbitrary surrounding in-
teractive protocols, was ﬁrst given recently in [10] with extensions in [11,8].
Based on the speciﬁc Dolev-Yao model whose soundness was proven in [10],
the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol was proved in [7] and a
variant of the 3KP payment protocol was proved in [5]. Besides the proof that
we present in this paper, the proof in [7,5] are the only Dolev-Yao-style, com-
putationally sound proof that we are aware of. However, they are considerably
simpler than the one we present in this work since it only addresses integrity
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properties whereas our proof additionally establishes conﬁdentiality proper-
ties; moreover, the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol and the 3KP protocol
do not use symmetric encryption, hence the commitment problem does not oc-
cur there which greatly simpliﬁes the proof. Another cryptographically sound
proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol was concurrently developed
by Warinschi [45]. The proof is conducted from scratch in the cryptographic
approach which takes it out of the scope of formal proof tools.
Laud [31] has recently presented a cryptographic underpinning for a Dolev-
Yao model of symmetric encryption under active attacks. His work enjoys a
direct connection with a formal proof tool, but it is speciﬁc to certain conﬁden-
tiality properties, restricts the surrounding protocols to straight-line programs
in a speciﬁc language, and does not address a connection to the remaining
primitives of the Dolev-Yao model. Herzog et al. [26] and Micciancio and
Warinschi [34] have recently also given a cryptographic underpinning under
active attacks. Their results are narrower than that in [10] since they are
speciﬁc for public-key encryption, but consider slightly simpler real imple-
mentations; moreover, the former relies on a stronger assumption whereas the
latter severely restricts the classes of protocols and protocol properties that
can be analyzed using this primitive. Section 6 of [34] further points out
several possible extensions of their work which all already exist in the earlier
work of [10]. Canetti and Herzog [19] have recently linked ideal functional-
ities for mutual authentication and key exchange protocols to corresponding
representations in a formal language. They apply their techniques to the
Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol by considering the exchanged nonces as
secret keys. Their work is restricted to the mentioned functionalities and in
contrast to the cryptographic library [10] hence does not address soundness
of Dolev-Yao models in their usual generality. The considered language does
not allow loops and oﬀers public-key encryption as the only cryptographic
operation. Moreover, their approach to deﬁne a mapping between ideal and
real traces following the ideas of [34] only captures trace-based properties (i.e.,
integrity properties); reasoning about secrecy properties additionally requires
ad-hoc and functionality-speciﬁc arguments.
Eﬀorts are also under way to formulate syntactic calculi for dealing with
probabilism and polynomial-time considerations, in particular [36,32,37,27]
and, as a second step, to encode them into proof tools. This approach can
not yet handle protocols with any degree of automation. It is complementary
to the approach of proving simple deterministic abstractions of cryptography
and working with those wherever cryptography is only used in a blackbox way.
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Outline.
Section 2 introduces the notation used in the paper and brieﬂy reviews
the aforementioned cryptographic library. Section 3 shows how to model the
Otway-Rees protocol based on this library as well as how initially shared
keys can be represented in the underlying model. Section 4 contains the
symbolic and cryptographic security properties of the Otway-Rees protocol.
The symbolic property is proven in Section 5, and Section 6 shows how to
derive the cryptographic property for the cryptographic implementation of
the protocol. Section 7 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we give an overview of the ideal cryptographic library
of [10,11,8] and brieﬂy sketch its provably secure implementation. We start
by introducing the notation used in this paper.
2.1 Notation
Let ↓ denote an error element available as an addition to the domains and
ranges of all functions and algorithms. The list operation is denoted as l :=
(x1, . . . , xj), and the arguments are unambiguously retrievable as l[i], with
l[i] = ↓ if i > j. A database D is a set of functions, called entries, each over a
ﬁnite domain called attributes. For an entry x ∈ D, the value at an attribute
att is written x.att . For a predicate pred involving attributes, D[pred ] means
the subset of entries whose attributes fulﬁll pred . If D[pred ] contains only one
element, we use the same notation for this element.
2.2 Overview of the Ideal and Real Cryptographic Library
The ideal (abstract) cryptographic library of [10,11,8] oﬀers its users abstract
cryptographic operations, such as commands to encrypt or decrypt a message,
to make or test a signature, and to generate a nonce. All these commands
have a simple, deterministic semantics. To allow a reactive scenario, this
semantics is based on state, e.g., of who already knows which terms; the
state is represented as a database. Each entry has a type (e.g., “ciphertext”),
and pointers to its arguments (e.g., a key and a message). Further, each entry
contains handles for those participants who already know it. A send operation
makes an entry known to other participants, i.e., it adds handles to the entry.
The ideal cryptographic library does not allow cheating. For instance, if it
receives a command to encrypt a message m with a certain key, it simply
makes an abstract database entry for the ciphertext. Another user can only
M. Backes / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 155 (2006) 111–145116
ask for decryption of this ciphertext if he has obtained handles to both the
ciphertext and the secret key.
To allow for the proof of cryptographic faithfulness, the library is based
on a detailed model of asynchronous reactive systems introduced in [42] and
represented as a deterministic machine THH, called trusted host. The param-
eter H ⊆ {1 . . . , n} denotes the honest participants, where n is a parameter
of the library denoting the overall number of participants. Depending on the
considered set H, the trusted host oﬀers slightly extended capabilities for the
adversary. However, for current purposes, the trusted host can be seen as
a slightly modiﬁed Dolev-Yao model together with a network and intruder
model, similar to “the CSP Dolev-Yao model” or “the inductive-approach
Dolev-Yao model”.
The real cryptographic library oﬀers its users the same commands as the
ideal one, i.e., honest users operate on cryptographic objects via handles. The
objects are now real cryptographic keys, ciphertexts, etc., handled by real dis-
tributed machines. Sending a term on an insecure channel releases the actual
bitstring to the adversary, who can do with it what he likes. The adversary
can also insert arbitrary bitstrings on non-authentic channels. The implemen-
tation of the commands is based on arbitrary secure encryption and signature
systems according to standard cryptographic deﬁnitions, with certain addi-
tions like type tagging and additional randomizations.
The security proof of [10] states that the real library is at least as secure
as the ideal library. This is captured using the notion of reactive simulata-
bility [42,13], which states that whatever an adversary can achieve in the
real implementation, another adversary can achieve given the ideal library, or
otherwise the underlying cryptography can be broken. This is the strongest
possible cryptographic relationship between a real and an ideal system. In
particular it covers arbitrary active attacks. Moreover, a composition theo-
rem exists in the underlying model [42,12], which states that one can securely
replace the ideal library in larger systems with the real library, i.e., without
destroying the already established simulatability relation.
2.3 Detailed Description of the State of the Cryptographic Library
We conclude this section with the rigorous deﬁnition of the state of the ideal
cryptographic library. A rigorous deﬁnition of the commands of the ideal
library used for modeling the Otway-Rees protocol as well as local adver-
sary commands that model the slightly extended adversary capabilities can
be found in [10,8].
The machine THH has ports inu? and outu ! for inputs from and outputs
to each user u ∈ H and for u = a, denoting the adversary. The notation
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follows the CSP convention, e.g., the cryptographic library obtains messages
at inu? that have been output at inu !. Besides the number n of users, the ideal
cryptographic library is parameterized by a tuple L of length functions which
are used to calculate the “length” of an abstract entry, corresponding to the
length of the corresponding bitstring in the real implementation. Moreover, L
contains bounds on the message lengths and the number of accepted inputs at
each port. These bounds can be arbitrarily large, but have to be polynomially
bounded in the security parameter.
Using the notation of [10], the ideal cryptographic library is a system
Syscry,idn,L that consists of several structures ({THH}, SH), one for each value
of the parameter H. Each structure consists of a set of machines, here only
containing the single machine THH, and a set SH := {inu?, outu ! | u ∈ H}
denoting those ports of THH that the honest users connect to. Formally, we
obtain Syscry,idn,L := {({THH}, SH) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}}. In the following, we omit
the parameters n and L for simplicity. 3
The main data structure of THH is a database D. The entries of D are
abstract representations of the data produced during a system run, together
with the information on who knows these data. Each entry in D is of the form
(recall the notation in Section 2.1)
(ind , type , arg, hndu1, . . . , hndum , hnda, len)
where H = {u1, . . . , um}. For each entry x ∈ D:
• x.ind ∈ INDS, called index, consecutively numbers all entries in D. The
set INDS is isomorphic to N and is used to distinguish index arguments
from others. The index is used as a primary key attribute of the database,
i.e., we write D[i] for the selection D[ind = i].
• x.type ∈ typeset identiﬁes the type of x.
• x.arg = (a1, a2, . . . , aj) is a possibly empty list of arguments. Many values
ai are indices of other entries in D and thus in INDS. We sometimes
distinguish them by a superscript “ind”.
• x.hndu ∈ HNDS ∪ {↓} for u ∈ H ∪ {a} are handles by which a user or
adversary u knows this entry. x.hndu = ↓ means that u does not know this
entry. The set HNDS is yet another set isomorphic to N. We always use a
superscript “hnd” for handles.
• x.len ∈ N0 denotes the “length” of the entry; it is computed by applying
the functions from L.
3 Formally, these parameters are thus also parameters of the ideal Otway-Rees system
SysOR,id that we introduce in Section 3.2.
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Initially, D is empty. THH has a counter size ∈ INDS for the current size
of D. For the handle attributes, it has counters curhndu (current handle)
initialized with 0.
3 The Otway-Rees Protocol
The Otway-Rees protocol [39] is a four-step protocol for establishing a shared
secret encryption key between two users. The protocol relies on a distinguished
trusted third party T, i.e., T ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and it is assumed that every user
u initially shares a secret key Kut with T. Expressed in the typical protocol
notation, the Otway-Rees protocol works as follows. 4
1. u → v :M, (Nu,M, u, v)Kut
2. v → T :M, (Nu,M, u, v)Kut, (Nv,M, u, v)Kvt
3. T→ v :M, (Nu, Kuv)Kut, (Nv, Kuv)Kvt
4. v → u :M, (Nu, Kuv)Kut.
3.1 Capturing Distributed Keys in the Abstract Library
In order to capture that keys shared between users and the trusted third party
have already been generated and distributed, we assume that suitable entries
for the keys already exist in the database. We denote the handle of u to the
secret key shared with v, where either u ∈ {1, . . . , n} and v = T or vice versa,
as sksehndu,v . More formally, we start with an initially empty database D, and
for each user u ∈ H two entries of the following form are added (the ﬁrst one
being a public-key identiﬁer for the actual secret key as described below in
more detail):
(ind := pkseu , type := pkse, arg := (), len := 0);
(ind := skseu , type := skse, arg := (ind − 1),
hndu := skse
hnd
u,T, hndT := skse
hnd
T,u, len := skse len
∗(k)).
Here pkseu and skseu are two consecutive natural numbers; treating public-
key identiﬁers as being of length 0 is a technicality in the proof of [8], and
skse len∗(k) denotes the abstract length of the secret key. These lengths will
not matter in the following.
The ﬁrst entry has to be incorporated in order to reﬂect special capabilities
that the adversary may have with respect to symmetric encryption schemes in
the real world. For instance it must be possible for an adversary against the
4 For simplicity, we omit the explicit inclusion of u and v in the unencrypted part of the
ﬁrst and second message since the cryptographic library already provides the identity of the
(claimed) sender of a message, which is suﬃcient for our purpose.
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ideal library to check whether encryptions have been created with the same se-
cret key since the deﬁnition of symmetric encryption schemes does not exclude
this and it can hence happen in the real system. For public-key encryption,
this was achieved in [10] by tagging ciphertexts with the corresponding public
key so that the public keys can be compared. For symmetric encryption, this
is not possible as no public key exists, hence this problem is solved by tagging
abstract ciphertexts with an otherwise meaningless “public key” solely used as
an identiﬁer for the secret key. Note that the argument of a secret key points
to its key identiﬁer. In the following, public-key identiﬁers will not matter any
further.
We omit the details of how these entries for user u are added by a command
gen symenc key, followed by a command send s for sending the secret key over
a secure channel.
3.2 The Otway-Rees Protocol Using the Abstract Library
We now model the Otway-Rees protocol in the framework of [42] and using
the ideal cryptographic library.
For each user u ∈ {1, . . . , n} we deﬁne a machine MORu , called a protocol
machine, which executes the protocol sketched above for participant identity
u. It is connected to its user via ports KS outu !, KS inu? (“KS” for “Key
Sharing”) and to the cryptographic library via ports inu !, outu?. We further
model the trusted third party as a machine MORT . It does not connect to any
users and is connected to the cryptographic library via ports inT!, outT?. The
combination of the protocol machines MORu , the trusted third party M
OR
T , and
the trusted host THH is the ideal Otway-Rees system Sys
OR,id. It is shown in
Figure 1; H and A model the arbitrary joint honest users and the adversary,
respectively.
Using the notation of [10], we have SysOR,id := {(MˆH, SH) | H ⊆
{1, . . . , n}}, cf. the deﬁnition of the ideal cryptographic library in Section 2.3,
where MˆH := {THH}∪{MORu | u ∈ H∪{T}} and SH := {KS inu?,KS outu ! | u ∈
H}, i.e., for a given set H of honest users, only the protocol machines MORu
with u ∈ H are actually present in a protocol run. The others are subsumed
in the adversary.
The state of the protocol machine MORu consists of the bitstring u and a
set Nonceu of pairs of the form (n
hnd, mhnd, v, j), where nhnd, mhnd are handles,
v ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Intuitively, a pair (nhnd, mhnd, v, j) states
that MORu generated the handle n
hnd in the j-th step of the protocol in a session
run with v and session identiﬁer mhnd. The set Nonceu is initially empty. The
trusted third party MORT maintains an initially empty set SIDT to store already
processed session IDs.
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Fig. 1. Overview of the Otway-Rees Ideal System.
We now deﬁne how the protocol machine MORu evaluates inputs. They
either come from user u at port KS inu? or from THH at port outu?. The
behavior of MORu in both cases is described in Algorithm 1 and 3 respectively,
which we will describe below. The trusted third party MORT only receives
inputs from the cryptographic library, and its behavior is described in Algo-
rithm 2. We refer to Step i of Algorithm j as Step j.i. All three algorithms
should immediately abort if a command to the cryptographic library does not
yield the desired result, e.g., if a decryption requests fails. For readability we
omit these abort checks in the algorithm descriptions; instead we impose the
following convention on all three algorithms.
Convention 1 For all w ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∪ {T} the following holds. If MORw
enters a command at port inw ! and receives ↓ at port outw? as the immedi-
ate answer of the cryptographic library, then MORw aborts the execution of the
current algorithm, except if the command was of the form list proj or send i.
Protocol start.
The user of the protocol machine MORu can start a new protocol with user
v ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u} by inputting (new prot,Otway Rees, v) at port KS inu?.
Our security proof holds for all adversaries and all honest users, i.e., especially
those that start protocols with the adversary (respectively a malicious user) in
parallel with protocols with honest users. Upon such an input, MORu builds up
the term corresponding to the ﬁrst protocol message using the ideal crypto-
graphic library according to Algorithm 1. The command gen nonce generates
the ideal nonce as well as the session identiﬁer. MORu stores the resulting han-
dles nhndu and m
hnd in Nonceu for future comparison together with the identity
of v and an indicator that these handles were generated in the ﬁrst step of the
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Algorithm 1. Evaluation of Inputs from the User (Protocol Start)
Input: (new prot,Otway Rees, v) at KS inu? with v ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u}.
1: nhndu ← gen nonce().
2: IDhnd ← gen nonce().
3: Nonceu := Nonceu ∪ {(nhndu , ID
hnd, v, 1)}.
4: uhnd ← store(u).
5: vhnd ← store(v).
6: lhnd1 ← list(n
hnd
u , ID
hnd, uhnd, vhnd).
7: chnd1 ← sym encrypt(skse
hnd
u,T, l
hnd
1 ).
8: mhnd1 ← list(ID
hnd, chnd1 ).
9: send i(v,mhnd1 ).
protocol. The command store inputs arbitrary application data into the cryp-
tographic library, here the user identities u and v. The command list forms
a list and sym encrypt is symmetric encryption. The ﬁnal command send i
means that MORu sends the resulting term to v over an insecure channel. The
eﬀect is that the adversary obtains a handle to the term and can decide what
to do with it (such as forwarding it to MORv ).
Algorithm 2. Behavior of the Trusted Third Party
Input: (v,T, i, mhnd) at outT? with v ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
1: IDhnd ← list proj(mhnd, 1). {IDhnd ≈ M}
2: type1 ← get type(ID
hnd).
3: c(3)
hnd
← list proj(mhnd, 3). {c(3)
hnd
≈ {Nv ,M, u, v}Kvt}
4: l(3)
hnd
← sym decrypt(sksehndT,v, c
(3)hnd). {l(3)
hnd
≈ {Nv ,M, u, v}}
5: yhndi ← list proj(l
(3)hnd , i) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
6: yi ← retrieve(yhndi ) for i = 3, 4.
7: if (IDhnd ∈ SIDT)∨ (type1 = nonce)∨ (y
hnd
2 = ID
hnd)∨ (y3 ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {v}) ∨ (y4 = v) then
8: Abort
9: end if
10: SIDT := SIDT ∪ {IDhnd}.
11: c(2)
hnd
← list proj(mhnd, 2). {c(2)
hnd
≈ {Nu,M, u, v}Kut}
12: l(2)
hnd
← sym decrypt(sksehndT,y3 , c
(2)hnd). {l(2)
hnd
≈ {Nu,M, u, v}}
13: xhndi ← list proj(l
(2)hnd , i) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
14: type2 ← get type(x
hnd
1 ).
15: xi ← retrieve(xhndi ) for i = 3, 4.
16: if (type2 = nonce) ∨ (x
hnd
2 = y
hnd
2 ) ∨ (x3 = y3) ∨ (x4 = y4) then
17: Abort
18: end if
19: sksehnd ← gen symenc key(). {sksehnd ≈ Kuv}
20: l(2)
hnd
3 ← list(x
hnd
1 , skse
hnd). {l
(2)hnd
3 ≈ {Nu,Kuv}}
21: c(2)
hnd
3 ← sym encrypt(skse
hnd
T,y3
, l
(2)hnd
3 ). {c
(2)hnd
3 ≈ {Nu,Kuv}Kut}
22: l(3)
hnd
3 ← list(y
hnd
1 , skse
hnd). {l
(3)hnd
3 ≈ {Nv ,Kuv}}
23: c(3)
hnd
3 ← sym encrypt(skse
hnd
T,v, l
(3)hnd
3 ). {c
(3)hnd
3 ≈ {Nv ,Kuv}Kvt}
24: mhnd3 ← list(ID
hnd, c
(2)hnd
3 , c
(3)hnd
3 ). {m
hnd
3 ≈ M, {Nu,Kuv}Kut , {Nv ,Kuv}Kvt}
25: send i(v,mhnd3 ).
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Evaluation of network inputs for protocol machines.
The behavior of the protocol machine MORu upon receiving an input from
the cryptographic library at port outu? (corresponding to a message that ar-
rives over the network) is deﬁned similarly in Algorithm 3. By construction
of THH, such an input is always of the form (v, u, i, m
hnd) where mhnd is a
handle to a list. To increase readability, and to clarify the connection between
the algorithmic description and the usual protocol notation, we augment the
algorithm with explanatory comments at its right-hand side to depict which
handle corresponds to which Dolev-Yao term. We further use the naming
convention that ingoing and outgoing messages are labeled m, where outgo-
ing messages have an additional subscript corresponding to the protocol step.
Encryptions are labeled c, the encrypted lists are labeled l, both with suitable
sub- and superscripts.
MORu ﬁrst determines the session identiﬁer and aborts if it is not of type
nonce. MORu then checks if the obtained message could correspond to the ﬁrst,
third, or fourth step of the protocol. (Recall that the second step is only per-
formed by T.) This is implemented by looking up the session identiﬁer in the
set Nonceu. After that, M
OR
u checks if the obtained message is indeed a suit-
ably constructed message for the particular step and the particular session ID
by exploiting the contents of Nonceu. If so, M
OR
u constructs a message accord-
ing to the protocol description, sends it to the intended recipient, updates the
set Nonceu, and possibly signals to its user that a key has been successfully
shared with another user.
Behavior of the trusted third party.
The behavior of MORT upon receiving an input (v,T, i, m
hnd) from the cryp-
tographic library at port outT? is deﬁned similarly in Algorithm 2. We omit
an informal description.
3.3 On Polynomial Runtime
In order to use existing composition results of the underlying model, the pro-
tocol machines MORw and M
OR
T must be polynomial-time. Similar to the cryp-
tographic library, we deﬁne that each of these machines maintains explicit
polynomial bounds on the message lengths and the number of inputs accepted
at each port.
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Algorithm 3. Evaluation of Inputs from THH (Network Inputs)
Input: (v, u, i,mhnd) at outu? with v ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u}.
1: IDhnd ← list proj(mhnd, 1). {IDhnd ≈ M}
2: type1 ← get type(ID
hnd).
3: if type1 = nonce then
4: Abort
5: end if
6: if v = T ∧ ∀j, nhnd : (nhnd, IDhnd, v, j)} ∈ Nonceu then {First Message is input}
7: c(2)
hnd
← list proj(mhnd, 2). {c(2)
hnd
≈ (Nv ,M, v, u)Kvt}
8: nhndu ← gen nonce().
9: Nonceu := Nonceu ∪ {(nhndu , ID
hnd, v, 2)}.
10: uhnd ← store(u).
11: vhnd ← store(v).
12: l(3)
hnd
2 ← list(n
hnd
u , ID
hnd, vhnd, uhnd). {l
(3)hnd
2 ≈ Nu,M, v, u}
13: c(3)
hnd
2 ← sym encrypt(skse
hnd
u,T, l
(3)hnd
2 ). {c
(3)hnd
2 ≈ (Nu,M, v, u)Kut}
14: mhnd2 ← list(ID
hnd, c(2)
hnd
, c
(3)hnd
2 ). {m
hnd
2 ≈ M, (Nv,M, v, u)Kvt , (Nu,M, v, u)Kut}
15: send i(T,mhnd2 ).
16: else if v = T then {Third Message is input}
17: c(2)
hnd
← list proj(mhnd, 2). {c(2)
hnd
≈ (Nv,Kuv)Kvt}
18: c(3)
hnd
← list proj(mhnd, 3). {c(3)
hnd
≈ (Nu,Kuv)Kut}
19: l(3)
hnd
← sym decrypt(sksehndu,T, c
(3)hnd). {l(3)
hnd
≈ Nu,Kuv}
20: yhndi ← list proj(l
(3)hnd , i) for i = 1, 2.
21: type2 ← get type(y
hnd
2 ).
22: if (  ∃!w ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u} : (yhnd1 , ID
hnd, w, 2) ∈ Nonceu) ∨ (type2 = skse) then
23: Abort
24: end if
25: Nonceu := (Nonceu \ {(yhnd1 , ID
hnd, w, 2)}) ∪ {(yhnd1 , ID
hnd, w, 3)}.
26: mhnd4 ← list(ID
hnd, c(2)
hnd
). {mhnd4 ≈ M, {Nv ,Kuv}Kvt}
27: send i(w,mhnd4 ).
28: Output (ok responder,Otway Rees, w, IDhnd, yhnd2 ) at KS outu !.
29: else if v = T ∧ ∃!nhnd : (nhnd, IDhnd, v, 1) then {Fourth Message is input}
30: c(2)
hnd
← list proj(mhnd, 2). {c(2)
hnd
≈ {Nu,Kuv}Kut}
31: l(2)
hnd
← sym decrypt(sksehndu,T, c
(2)hnd). {l(2)
hnd
≈ {Nu,Kuv}}
32: xhndi ← list proj(l
(2)hnd , i) for i = 1, 2.
33: type3 ← get type(x
hnd
2 ).
34: if xhnd1 = n
hnd ∨ type3 = skse then
35: Abort
36: end if
37: Nonceu := (Nonceu \ {(xhnd1 , ID
hnd, v, 1)}) ∪ {(xhnd1 , ID
hnd, v, 4)}.
38: Output (ok initiator,Otway Rees, v, IDhnd, xhnd2 ) at KS outu !.
39: else
40: Abort
41: end if
4 The Security Property
In the following, we formalize the security property of the ideal and real Otway-
Rees protocols. The property consists of a key secrecy property and a consis-
tency property. We ﬁrst formalize the ideal key secrecy property which is an
instantiation of a general key secrecy deﬁnition for arbitrary protocols based
on the ideal cryptographic library. It was introduced in [9] and is symbolic,
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based on the typical notion that a term is not an element of the adversary’s
knowledge set. In the given Dolev-Yao-style library, the adversary’s knowledge
set is the set of all terms to which the adversary has a handle. After that we
introduce the notion of cryptographic, real-or-random key secrecy based on
the real cryptographic library. Finally, we express the consistency property,
and we distinguish perfect and computational fulﬁllment of the property.
4.1 Deﬁnition of the Key Secrecy Property
The ﬁrst step towards deﬁning symbolic key secrecy is to consider one state
of the ideal Dolev-Yao-style library and to deﬁne that a handle points to a
symmetric key, that the key is symbolically unknown to the adversary, and
that it has not been used for encryption. These are the symbolic conditions
under which we can hope to prove that the corresponding real key is indistin-
guishable from a fresh random key for the adversary. Note that the operations
that the Otway-Rees protocol performs on new keys are allowed in this sense.
For Condition (3) in the deﬁnition, note that the arguments of a ciphertext
term are (l, pk) where l is the plaintext index and pk the index of the public
tag of the secret key, with pk = sk − 1 for the secret key index.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Symbolically Secret Encryption Keys [9]) Let {T} ⊆ H ⊆
{1, . . . , n,T}, a database state D of THH, and a pair (u, lhnd) ∈ H×HNDS of
a user and a handle be given. Let i := D[hndu = l
hnd].ind be the corresponding
database index. The term under (u, lhnd) (1) is a symmetric encryption key iﬀ
D[i].type = skse, (2) is symbolically unknown (to the adversary) iﬀ D[i].hnda =
↓, (3) has not been used for encryption, or short is unused, iﬀ for all indices
j ∈ N we have D[j].type = symenc ⇒ D[j].arg[2] = i − 1, and (4) is a
symbolically secret key iﬀ it has the three previous properties.
A secret-key belief function is a general way to designate the keys whose
secrecy should be proved. The underlying theory from [9] is based on such
functions. We instantiate them for the Otway-Rees protocol and thus essen-
tially for all individual key exchange protocols. A secret key belief function
maps the user view to a set of triples (u, lhnd, t) of a user, a handle, and a
type, pointing to the supposedly secret keys. For the Otway-Rees protocol,
we deﬁne secret-key belief functions seckeys initiator OR for the initiator and
seckeys responder OR for the responder that designate the exchanged keys.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Secret-key Belief Functions for the Otway-Rees Protocol) A
secret-key belief function for a set H is a function seckeys that maps each view
view of the user to an element of (H×HNDS × {skse})∗.
The secret-key belief functions seckeys initiator OR and
seckeys responder OR of the Otway-Rees protocol map each
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element (ok initiator,Otway Rees, v, IDhnd, sksehnd) respectively
(ok responder,Otway Rees, v, IDhnd, sksehnd) of view arriving at port KE outu?
in the users view to (u, sksehnd, skse) if u ∈ H, and to  otherwise. Elements
of view that are not of this form are also mapped to .
We now deﬁne symbolic key secrecy for such a function. In addition to the
conditions for individual keys, we require that all elements point to diﬀerent
terms, so that we can expect the corresponding list of cryptographic keys to
be entirely random.
Deﬁnition 4.3 (Symbolic Key Secrecy Generally and for the Otway-Rees
Protocol) Let a user H suitable for a structure ({THH}, SH) of the crypto-
graphic library Syscry,id and a secret-key belief function seckeys for H be given.
The ideal cryptographic library with this user keeps the keys in seckeys strictly
symbolically secret iﬀ for all conﬁgurations conf = ({THH}, SH,H,A) of this
structure, every v ∈ view conf (H), and every element (ui, li
hnd, ti) of the set
seckeys(v), the term under (ui, li
hnd) is a symbolically secret key of type ti,
and D[hndui = li
hnd].ind = D[hnduj = lj
hnd].ind for all i = j.
The ideal Otway-Rees protocol keeps the exchanged keys of honest users
strictly symbolically secret iﬀ the ideal cryptographic library keeps the keys in
seckeys initiator OR and seckeys responder OR strictly symbolically secret with
all users H∗ that are the combination of the machines MORu for u ∈ H and a
user H of those machines.
General cryptographic key secrecy requires that no polynomial-time ad-
versary can distinguish the keys designated by the function seckeys from fresh
keys. The cryptographic key secrecy of the Otway-Rees protocol is the in-
stantiation for seckeys initiator OR and seckeys responder OR and the conﬁgu-
rations of the Otway-Rees protocol.
Deﬁnition 4.4 (Cryptographic (Real-or-random) Key Secrecy Generally and
for the Otway-Rees Protocol) Let a polynomial-time conﬁguration conf =
(MˆH, SH,H,A) of the real cryptographic library Sys
cry,real
SE
and a secret-key
belief function seckeys for H be given. Let genSE denote the key generation
algorithm. This conﬁguration keeps the keys in seckeys cryptographically secret
iﬀ for all probabilistic-polynomial time algorithms Dis (the distinguisher), we
have
|Pr[Dis(1k, va, keysreal) = 1]− Pr[Dis(1
k, va, keysfresh) = 1]| ∈ NEGL
where NEGL denotes the negligible function of the security parameter k
and the used random variables are deﬁned as follows: For r ∈ runconf , let
va := view conf (A)(r) be the view of the adversary, let (ui, li
hnd, ti)i=1,...,n :=
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seckeys(view conf (H)(r)) be the user-handle-type triples of presumably secret
keys, and let the keys be keysreal := (ski)i=1,...,n with
ski :=Dui[hndui = li
hnd].word if Dui [hndui = li
hnd].type = ti, else ;
and keysfresh := (sk
′
i)i=1,...,n with sk
′
i ← genA(1
k) if ti = ska, else sk
′
i ← .
A polynomial-time conﬁguration (MˆH ∪ {MORu | u ∈ H}, SH,H,A) of the
real Otway-Rees protocol SysOR,real keeps the exchanged keys of honest users
cryptographically secret iﬀ the conﬁguration (MˆH, SH, {H}∪{M
OR
u | u ∈ H},A)
keeps the keys in seckeys initiator OR and seckeys responder OR cryptographi-
cally secret.
4.2 Deﬁnition of the Consistency Property
The consistency property states that if two honest users establish a session
key then both need to have a consistent view of who the peers to the session
are, i.e., if an honest user u establishes a key with v, and v establishes the
same key with another user w, then u has to equal w. Moreover, we incor-
porate the correctness of the protocol into the consistency property, i.e., if
the aforementioned outputs occur and u = w holds, then both parties have
obtained the same key. 5 In the following deﬁnitions, we write t : D to denote
the contents of database D at time t, and t : p?m and t : p!m to denote that
message m occurs at input port respectively output port p at time t.
The consistency property ReqCons is formally captured as fol-
lows: Assume that outputs (ok initiator,Otway Rees, v, IDhndu , skseu
hnd) and
(ok responder,Otway Rees, w, IDhndv , sksev
hnd) occur at KS outu ! respectively at
KS outv ! at arbitrary times t1 and t2 for honest users u and v such that the ses-
sion identiﬁers are the same, i.e., t1 : D[hndu = ID
hnd
u ] = t2 : D[hndv = ID
hnd
v ].
Then the handles skseu
hnd and sksev
hnd point to the same entry in the
database, i.e., t1 : D[hndu = skseu
hnd] = t2 : D[hndv = sksev
hnd] if and
only if u = w. The formal deﬁnition of ReqCons is given in Figure 2.
Note that the consistency property ReqCons speciﬁcally relies on the state
of THH, hence it cannot be used as is to capture the security of the real Otway-
Rees system, where THH is replaced with the secure implementation of the
cryptographic library. The corresponding consistency property ReqConsreal for the
real Otway-Rees system can be deﬁned by requiring that both handles point to
the same bitstring, i.e., by replacing t1 : D[hndu = skseu
hnd] = t2 : D[hndv =
sksev
hnd with t1 : Du[hndu = skseu
hnd].word = t2 : Dv[hndv = sksev
hnd].word
5 A violation of this correctness aspect has been pointed out in [28] which arises since in
their modeling the trusted third party creates multiple keys if it is repeatedly triggered with
the same message. We explicitly excluded this in our deﬁnition of the trusted third party
by storing the session IDs processed so far, cf. Step 7 and 10 in Algorithm 2.
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∀u, v ∈ H, ∀t1, t2 ∈ N : # For all honest users u and v:
t1 : KS outu !(ok initiator,Otway Rees, v , ID
hnd
u , skseu
hnd) ∧ # if u shares a key with v
t2 : KS outv !(ok responder,Otway Rees,w , ID
hnd
v , sksev
hnd) ∧ # and v shares a key with w
t1 : D[hndu = ID
hnd
u ] = t2 : D[hndv = ID
hnd
v ] # and the sessions are equal
⇒ (u = w ⇔ # then u is equal to w iﬀ
t1 : D[hndu = skseu
hnd] = t2 : D[hndv = sksev
hnd]) # both keys are equal.
Fig. 2. The Consistency Property ReqCons.
for the databases Du and Dv of the real library.
The notion of a system Sys fulﬁlling such a property Req essentially comes
in two ﬂavors [6]. Perfect fulﬁllment, Sys |=perf Req , means that the property
holds with probability one (over the probability spaces of runs, a well-deﬁned
notion from the underlying model [42]) for all honest users and for all adver-
saries. Computational fulﬁllment, Sys |=poly Req , means that the property only
holds for polynomially bounded users and adversaries, and only with negligible
error probability. Perfect fulﬁllment implies computational fulﬁllment.
The following theorem captures the security of the Otway-Rees protocol.
Theorem 4.5 (Security of the Otway-Rees Protocol) Let SysOR,id and
SysOR,real be the ideal and real Otway-Rees system, respectively, as deﬁned
in Section 3.2. Then we have:
• Secrecy: SysOR,id keeps the exchanged keys of honest users strictly symbol-
ically secret, and all polynomial-time conﬁgurations of SysOR,real keep the
exchanged keys of honest users cryptographically secret.
• Consistency: SysOR,id perfectly fulﬁlls the consistency property ReqCons,
and SysOR,real computationally fulﬁlls the consistency property ReqConsreal , i.e.,
SysOR,id |=perf ReqCons ∧ SysOR,real |=poly ReqConsreal .
5 Proof in the Ideal Setting
This section contains the proof of the ideal part of Theorem 4.5, i.e., the
proof of the Otway-Rees protocol using the ideal, deterministic cryptographic
library. The proof idea is the following: If an honest user u successfully
terminates a session run with another honest user v, then we ﬁrst show that
the established key has been created before by the trusted third party. After
that, we exploit that the trusted third party as well as all honest users may
only send this key within an encryption generated with a key shared between
u and T respectively v and T, and we conclude that the adversary hence never
gets a handle to the key. The main challenge was to ﬁnd suitable invariants on
the state of the ideal Otway-Rees system. This is somewhat similar to formal
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proofs using the Dolev-Yao model, and the similarity supports our hope that
the new, sound cryptographic library can be used in the place of the Dolev-
Yao models in automated tools. The proof of the invariants is postponed to
Appendix A.
5.1 Invariants
The ﬁrst invariants, correct nonce owner and unique nonce use, are easily
proved and essentially state that handles xhnd where (xhnd, ·, ·, ·) is contained
in a set Nonceu indeed point to entries of type nonce, and that no nonce is in
two such sets. The next two invariants, nonce secrecy and nonce-list secrecy,
deal with the secrecy of certain terms. They are mainly needed to prove the
invariant correct list generation, which establishes who created certain terms.
The last invariant, key secrecy, states that the adversary never learns keys
created by the trusted third party for use between honest users.
• Correct Nonce Owner. For all u ∈ H, and for all (xhnd, ·, ·, ·) ∈ Nonceu, it
holds D[hndu = x
hnd] = ↓ and D[hndu = x
hnd].type = nonce.
• Unique Nonce Use. For all u, v ∈ H, all w,w′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and all j ≤
size: If (D[j].hndu , ·, w, ·) ∈ Nonceu and (D[j].hndv , ·, w′, ·) ∈ Noncev, then
(u, w) = (v, w′).
Nonce secrecy states that the nonces exchanged between honest users u and
v remain secret from all other users and from the adversary. For the formal-
ization, note that the handles xhnd to these nonces are contained as elements
(xhnd, ·, v, ·) in the set Nonceu. The claim is that the other users and the
adversary have no handles to such a nonce in the database D of THH:
• Nonce Secrecy. For all u, v ∈ H and for all j ≤ size: If (D[j].hndu , ·, v, ·) ∈
Nonceu then D[j].hndw = ↓ implies w ∈ {u, v,T}. In particular, this means
D[j].hnd a = ↓.
Similarly, the invariant nonce-list secrecy states that a list containing such a
handle can only be known to u, v, and T. Further, it states that the identity
ﬁelds in such lists are correct. Moreover, if such a list is an argument of another
entry, then this entry is an encryption created with the secret key that either
u or v share with T. (Formally this means that this entry is tagged with the
corresponding public-key identiﬁer as an abstract argument, cf. Section 3.1.)
• Nonce-List Secrecy. For all u, v ∈ H and for all j ≤ size with D[j].type =
list: Let x indi := D[j].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. If (D[x
ind
1 ].hndu , ·, v, l) ∈ Nonceu
then
a) D[j].hndw = ↓ implies w ∈ {u, v,T} for l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
b) If l ∈ {1, 4} and D[x ind3 ].type = data, then D[x
ind
3 ].arg = (u) and
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D[x ind4 ].arg = (v).
c) If l ∈ {2, 3} and D[x ind3 ].type = data, then D[x
ind
3 ].arg = (v) and
D[x ind4 ].arg = (u).
d) for l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and for all k ≤ size it holds j ∈ D[k].arg only if
D[k].type = symenc and D[k].arg[1] ∈ {pkseu, pksev}.
The invariant correct list owner states that certain protocol messages can only
be constructed by the “intended” users respectively by the trusted third party.
• Correct List Owner. For all u, v ∈ H and for all j ≤ size with D[j].type =
list: Let x indi := D[j].arg[i] for i = 1, 2 and x
hnd
1,u := D[x
ind
1 ].hndu .
a) If (xhnd1,u , ·, v, l) ∈ Nonceu and D[x
ind
2 ].type = skse, then D[j] was created
by MORu in Step 1.6 if l = 1 and in Step 3.12 if l = 2.
b) If (xhnd1,u , ID
hnd
u , v, l) ∈ Nonceu and D[x
ind
2 ].type = skse, then D[j] was cre-
ated by MORT in Step 2.22 if l = 3 and in Step 2.20 if l = 4. Moreover,
we have D[hndu = ID
hnd
u ] = D[hndT = ID
hnd
T ], where ID
hnd
T denotes the
handle that T obtained in Step 2.1 in the same execution.
Finally, the invariant key secrecy states that a secret key entry that has been
generated by the trusted third party to be shared between honest users u and
v can only be known to u, v, and T. In particular, the adversary will never get
a handle to it. This invariant is key for proving the secrecy and the consistency
property of the Otway-Rees protocol.
• Key Secrecy. For all u, v ∈ H and for all j ≤ size with D[j].type = skse:
If D[j] was created by MORT in Step 2.19 and, with the notation of Algo-
rithm 2, we have that y3 = u and y4 = v in the current execution of M
OR
T ,
then D[j].hndw = ↓ implies w ∈ {u, v,T}.
Formally, the invariance of the above statements is captured in the follow-
ing lemma.
Lemma 5.1 The statements correct nonce owner, unique nonce use, nonce
secrecy, nonce-list secrecy, correct list owner, and key secrecy are invariants
of SysOR,id, i.e., they hold at all times in all runs of {MORu | u ∈ H ∪ {T}} ∪
{THH,H,A} for all H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, all users H and all adversaries A.
The proof is postponed to Appendix A.
5.2 Proof of the Ideal Part of Theorem 4.5
For the proof of the ideal part of Theorem 4.5, the following property of THH
proven in [10] will be useful.
Lemma 5.2 The ideal cryptographic library Syscry,id has the following prop-
erty: The only modiﬁcations to existing entries x in D are assignments to
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previously undeﬁned attributes x.hndu (except for counter updates in entries
for signature keys, which we do not have to consider here), and appending
new elements to the list of arguments of symmetric encryptions.
Proof. (Theorem 4.5) Assume that MORu outputs
(ok x ,Otway Rees, v, IDhndu , skse
hnd
u ) at KS outu ! for x ∈ {initiator, responder},
u ∈ H and v ∈ {1, . . . , n} at time t3, and set skse
ind := D[hndu = skse
hnd
u ].ind .
By deﬁnition of Algorithms 1 and 3, this output can only happen in Step 3.28
respectively 3.38, and only after there was an input (v, u, i, m3
hnd
u ) respectively
(v, u, i, m4
hnd
u ) at outu? at a time t2 < t3. Here and in the sequel we use
the notation of Algorithm 1- 3, but we distinguish the variables from its
diﬀerent executions by an additional superscript indicating the number of
the (claimed) received protocol message, here 3 and 4, and give handles an
additional subscript for their owner, here u.
Case 1: Output in Step 3.28.
Assume that MORu outputs (ok responder,Otway Rees, v, ID
hnd
u , skse
3hnd
u ) at
KS outu ! for u ∈ H and v ∈ {1, . . . , n} in Step 3.28 at time t3. Hence,
the execution of Algorithm 3 for this input must have given l
(3),3hnd
u = ↓ in
Step 3.19, since the algorithm would otherwise abort by Convention 1 without
creating an output.
Let l(3),3
ind
:= D[hndu = l
(3),3hnd
u ].ind . The algorithm further implies
D[l(3),3
ind
].type = list. Let y3i
ind
:= D[l(3),3
ind
].arg[i] for i = 1, 2 at the time
of Step 3.20. By deﬁnition of list proj and since the condition of Step 3.22 is
false, we have
y3
hnd
1,u = D[y
3
1
ind
].hndu at time t3, (1)
(y3
hnd
1,u , ID
hnd, v, 3) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[y
3
2
ind
].type = skse at time t3, (2)
and
(y3
hnd
1,u , ID
hnd, v, 2) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[y
3
2
ind
].type = skse at time t2. (3)
Case 2: Output in Step 3.38.
This case is similar to the ﬁrst one: Assume that MORu outputs
(ok initiator,Otway Rees, v, IDhndu , skse
4hnd
u ) at KS outu ! for u ∈ H and v ∈
{1, . . . , n} in Step 3.38 at time t3. The execution of Algorithm 3 for this
input must have given l
(2),4hnd
u = ↓ in Step 3.31, since it would other-
wise abort by Convention 1 without creating an output. Let l(2),4
ind
:=
D[hndu = l
(2),4hnd
u ].ind , where the algorithm implies D[l(2),4
ind
].type = list. Let
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x4i
ind
:= D[l(2),4
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2 at the time of Step 3.32. By deﬁnition of
list proj and because of the conditions of Step 3.29 and 3.34, we have
x4
hnd
1,u = D[x
4
1
ind
].hndu at time t3, (4)
(x4
hnd
1,u , ID
hnd
u , v, 4) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[x
4
2
ind
].type = skse at time t3, (5)
and
(x4
hnd
1,u , ID
hnd
u , v, 1) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[x
4
2
ind
].type = skse at time t2. (6)

This ﬁrst part of the proof shows that MORu has received a list corresponding
to a third or fourth protocol message. Now we apply correct list owner to the
list entry D[l(3),3
ind
] for the ﬁrst case respectively to D[l(2),4
ind
] for the second
case to show that this entry was created by MORT .
Proof. [cont’d] Equations (1) and (2) respectively Equations (4) and (5) are
the preconditions for Part b) of correct list owner. Hence the entry D[l(3),3
ind
]
was created by MORT in Step 2.20 respectively the entry D[l
(2),4ind] was created
by MORT in Step 2.22.
In both cases, the algorithm execution must have started with an input
(w,T, i, m2
hnd
T ) at outT? at a time t1 < t2 with w ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We conclude
l
(3),2hnd
T = ↓ in Step 2.4 because of Convention 1, set l
(3),2ind := D[hndT =
l
(3),2hnd
T ].ind , and obtain D[l
(3),2 ind].type = list. Correct list owner furthermore
implies D[hndT = ID
2hnd
T ] = D[hndu = ID
hnd
u ]. Let y
2
i
ind
:= D[l(3),2
ind
].arg [i]
for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 at the time of Step 2.5.
As the condition of Step 2.7 is false immediately afterwards, we obtain
y2
hnd
i,T = ↓ for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The deﬁnition of list proj and Lemma 5.2 imply
y2
hnd
i,T = D[y
2
i
ind
].hndT for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} at time t3. (7)
Step 2.7 further ensures y23 ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {w} and y
2
4 = w.
As above, we conclude l
(2),2hnd
T = ↓ in Step 2.12, set l
(2),2ind := D[hndT =
l
(2),2hnd
T ].ind , and obtain D[l
(2),2ind].type = list. Let x2i
ind
:= D[l(2),2
ind
].arg [i] for
i = 1, 2, 3, 4 at the time of Step 2.13. As the condition of Step 2.16 is false
immediately afterwards, we obtain x2
hnd
i,T = ↓ for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The deﬁnition
of list proj and Lemma 5.2 again imply
x2
hnd
i,T = D[x
2
i
ind
].hndT for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} at time t3. (8)
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Step 2.16 furthermore ensures x23 = y
2
3 and x
2
4 = y
2
4. By deﬁnition of
the command gen symenc key, we obtain skse2
hnd
T = ↓ in Step 2.19 and set
skse2
ind
:= D[hndT = skse
2hnd
T ].ind .
Now we exploit that MORT creates the entry D[l
(3),3 ind] in Step 3.22 with
the input list(y2
hnd
1,T , skse
2hnd
T ) respectively the entry D[l
(2),4ind] in Step 2.20 with
the input list(x2
hnd
1,T , skse
2hnd
T ). With the deﬁnitions of list and list proj, and with
Equations (7) and (8), this implies y21
ind
= y31
ind
and skseind = y32
ind
= y22
ind
=
skse2
ind
respectively x21
ind
= x31
ind
and skseind = x42
ind
= x22
ind
= skse2
ind
. Thus
Equations (1) and (3) imply
(y2
hnd
1,u , ID
hnd
u , v, 2) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[y
2
2
ind
].type = skse at time t2 (9)
respectively Equations (4) and (6) imply
(x2
hnd
1,u , ID
hnd
u , v, 1) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[x
2
2
ind
].type = skse at time t2. (10)

We are now ready to show symbolic secrecy of the exchanged keys, i.e., to
derive that the terms selected by seckeys initiator OR and seckeys responder OR
are symbolically unused symmetric keys that have furthermore not been used
for encryption yet.
Proof. [cont’d, secrecy requirement] With the notation of the previous proof,
assume additionally that v ∈ H. Together with Equation 9 and Equation 10,
nonce-list secrecy applied to the entry D[l(3),3
ind
] respectively D[l(2),4
ind
] now
immediately implies that {y23, y
2
4} = {u, v} respectively {x
2
3, x
2
4} = {u, v}.
This gives the precondition to apply key secrecy to the entry D[skse2
ind
],
which implies D[skse2
ind
].hnd a = ↓. Because of skse2
ind
= skseind we have
D[skse2
ind
].hnd a = D[skse
ind].hnd a = ↓, i.e., the term under (u, skse
hnd
u )
is symbolically unknown. Moreover Equation 9 and Equation 10 imply
D[skseind].type = D[skse2
ind
].type = skse, i.e., the term under (u, sksehndu )
is a symmetric key.
It remains to show that the key is unused at time t3. The only way to
create an entry D[j] with D[j].type = symenc and D[j].arg[2] = skseind − 1 is
by inputting a command sym encrypt at port inw? such that D[skse
ind].hndw =
↓. Since we have shown that D[skseind].hndw = ↓ only if w ∈ {u, v,T}, it
remains to show that neither of them enters such a command until time t3.
By inspection of Algorithm 2, this clearly holds for T, since this may only
happen in Steps 2.21 or 2.23. In both cases, the key used is one of those
that were initially distributed, i.e., D[j].arg[2] = sksew − 1 for some w ∈
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{1, . . . , n}. Since we have shown that each key selected by seckeys initiator OR
or seckeys responder OR is newly generated by MORT , we in particular have
sksew = skse
ind. Similar reasoning can be applied to Algorithm 1 and 3 of
MORu to show that the only used keys are the ones shared between u and T
respectively between v and T.

It remains to show the consistency requirement ReqSec.
Proof. [cont’d, consistency requirement] Assume that MORu outputs
(ok initiator,Otway Rees, v, IDhndu , skse
hnd
u ) at KS outu ! at time t3 and that M
OR
v
outputs (ok responder,Otway Rees, w, IDhndv , skse
hnd
v ) at KS outv ! at time t
′
3 for
u, v ∈ H and w ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and let t3 : D[hndu = ID
hnd
u ] = t
′
3 : D[hndv =
IDhndv ]. We again use the notation of the main proof.
To show the left-to-right direction of the consistency property, assume
that u = w. Let skse indu := D[hndu = skse
hnd
u ].ind and skse
ind
v := D[hndv =
sksehndv ].ind . Now the main proof immediately yields D[hndu = ID
hnd
u ] =
D[hndT = ID
2hnd
T ] = D[hndv = ID
hnd
v ], i.e., both D[skse
ind
u ] and D[skse
ind
u ] have
been created in an execution of MT with the same handle ID
hnd
T . Because
of the check in Step 2.7 and because of Step 2.10 both entries must have
been created in the same execution, which immediately implies t3 : D[hndu =
sksehndu ] = t
′
3 : D[hndv = skse
hnd
v ], and we are done.
To show the right-to-left direction, assume that t3 : D[hndu = skse
hnd
u ] =
t′3 : D[hndv = skse
hnd
v ] holds. We have already shown that
D[hndu = skse
hnd
u ].hnd z = ↓ =⇒ z ∈ {u, v,T}. (11)
Hence only u, v, and T can get a handle to D[hnd v = skse
hnd
v ].
We ﬁrst show that if w also got a handle to D[hndv = skse
hnd
v ] then
u = w trivially holds. Because of D[hndu = skse
hnd
u ].hnd z = ↓ only if z ∈
{u, v,T}, we conclude w ∈ {u, v,T}. Hence it remains to show w ∈ {v,T}.
However, the output (ok,Otway Rees, w, IDhndv , skse
hnd
v ) may only occur if the
checks in Step 3.22 or 3.29 succeeded, which ensures that (·, ·, w, ·) ∈ Noncev
immediately before time t′3. Consider the ﬁrst time that an element containing
w as its third component was entered into Noncev. This could either happen in
Step 1.3 or in Step 3.9. In both cases however, we obtain w ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {v}
by deﬁnition of Algorithm 1 and 3, hence we have u = w as desired.
To conclude the proof, we have to consider those cases where w does not
get a handle to D[hndv = skse
hnd
v ]. We show that if an honest v outputs
(ok,Otway Rees, w, IDhndv , skse
hnd
v ), then the adversary can ensure that w gets
a handle to D[hndv = skse
hnd
v ] (i.e., that there exists an adversary that sched-
ules messages in a way that gives w this handle), and hence we obtain u = w
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as in the previous case. The existence of such an adversary is intuitively clear
and technically follows immediately from the main proof: We have that the
entry D[hndv = skse
hnd
v ] was created by M
OR
T , and assume that M
OR
T outputs
send i(w′, mhnd3 ) in Step 2.25 for some w
′. Let m3
ind
:= D[hndT = m
hnd
3 ]. We
can assume that w′ ∈ H as the adversary would otherwise obtain a handle
to D[hndu = skse
hnd
u ], which would yield a contradiction to Equation 11.
As shown in the proof of the secrecy property, nonce-list secrecy implies
w′ ∈ {v, w}, hence either the second component or the third component of
D[m3
ind
] is an encryption with the key that w shares with T. The command
send i gives the adversary a handle mhnd3,a to m
3ind, i.e., mhnd3,a := D[m
3ind].hnd a.
If w = w′ (which means that w will be able to decrypt the third compo-
nent of D[m3
ind
]), the adversary forwards mhnd3 to w. (Formally, it inputs
adv send i(w,T, mhnd3,a ) at ina?.) The machine M
OR
w will then obtain a handle
to D[hndv = skse
hnd
v ] in Step 3.20, where the correctness of the previous de-
cryption step follows as in the main proof. If w = w′, i.e., w will be able to
decrypt the second component of m3
ind
, the adversary ﬁrst determines han-
dles to the ﬁrst two components of m3
ind
by means of the command list proj,
i.e., IDhnda ← list proj(m
hnd
3,a , 1) and c
(2)hnd
3,a ← list proj(m
hnd
3,a , 2). It then creates
a message mhnd ← list(IDhnda , c
(2)hnd
3,a ) and sends m
hnd to w claiming to be v.
(Formally, the input is adv send i(w, v,mhnd). Similar to the previous case,
the machine MORw will then obtain a handle to D[hndv = skse
hnd
v ], but now in
Step 3.32. 
6 Proof of the Cryptographic Realization
If Theorem 4.5 has been proven, it remains to show that the Otway-Rees
protocol based on the real cryptographic library computationally fulﬁlls cor-
responding secrecy and consistency requirements. Obviously, carrying over
properties from the ideal to the real system crucially relies on the fact that
the real cryptographic library is at least as secure as the ideal one. As brieﬂy
sketched in the introduction, this has been established in [10,8], but only sub-
ject to the side condition that the surrounding protocol, i.e., the Otway-Rees
protocol in our case, does not raise a so-called commitment problem. Estab-
lishing this side condition is crucial for using symmetric encryption in abstract,
cryptographically sound proofs. We explain the commitment problem in de-
tail in the next section to illustrate the cryptographic issue underlying the
commitment problem, and we exploit the invariants of Section 5 to show that
the commitment problem does not occur for the Otway-Rees protocol. As our
proof is the ﬁrst Dolev-Yao-style, computationally sound proof of a protocol
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that uses symmetric encryption, our result also shows that the commitment
problem, and hence also symmetric encryption, can be conveniently dealt with
in cryptographically sound proofs of security by means of the approach of [8].
For technical reasons, one further has to ensure that the surrounding proto-
col does not create “encryption cycles” (such as encrypting a key with itself),
which had to be required even for acquiring properties weaker than simulata-
bility, cf. [3] for further discussions. This property is only a technical subtlety
and clearly holds for the Otway-Rees protocol.
6.1 Absence of the Commitment Problem for the Otway-Rees Protocol
As the name suggests, a “commitment problem” in simulatability proofs cap-
tures a situation where the simulator commits itself to a certain message and
later has to change this commitment to allow for a correct simulation. In the
case of symmetric encryption, the commitment problem occurs if the simu-
lator learns in some abstract way that a ciphertext was sent and hence has
to construct an indistinguishable ciphertext, knowing neither the secret key
nor the plaintext used for the corresponding ciphertext in the real world. To
simulate the missing key, the simulator will create a new secret key, or rely on
an arbitrary, ﬁxed key if the encryption systems guarantees indistinguishable
keys, see [3]. Instead of the unknown plaintext, the simulator will encrypt
an arbitrary message of the correct length, relying on the indistinguishability
of ciphertexts of diﬀerent messages. So far, the simulation is ﬁne. It even
stays ﬁne if the message becomes known later because secure encryption still
guarantees that it is indistinguishable that the simulator’s ciphertext contains
a wrong message. However, if the secret key becomes known later, the simu-
lator runs into trouble, because, learning abstractly about this fact, it has to
produce a suitable key that decrypts its ciphertext into the correct message. It
cannot cheat with the message because it has to produce the correct behavior
towards the honest users. This is typically not possible.
The solution for this problem taken in [8] for the cryptographic library is to
leave it to the surrounding protocol to guarantee that the commitment prob-
lem does not occur, i.e., the surrounding protocol must guarantee that keys
are no longer sent in a form that might make them known to the adversary
once an honest participant has started using them. To exploit the simulata-
bility results of [8], we hence have to prove this condition for the Otway-Rees
protocol. Formally, we have to show that the following property NoComm
does not occur: “If there exists an input from an honest user that causes a
symmetric encryption to be generated such that the corresponding key is not
known to the adversary, then future inputs may only cause this key to be sent
within an encryption that cannot be decrypted by the adversary”. This event
M. Backes / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 155 (2006) 111–145136
can be rigorously deﬁned in the style of the secrecy and consistency property
but we omit the rigorous deﬁnition due to space constraints and refer to [8].
The event NoComm is equivalent to the event “if there exists an input from
an honest user that causes a symmetric encryption to be generated such that
the corresponding key is not known to the adversary, the adversary never gets
a handle to this key” but NoComm has the advantage that it can easily be in-
ferred from the abstract protocol description without presupposing knowledge
about handles of the cryptographic library. For the Otway-Rees protocol the
event NoComm can easily be veriﬁed by inspection of the abstract protocol
description, and a detailed proof based on Algorithms 1-3 can also easily be
performed by exploiting the invariants of Section 5.
Lemma 6.1 (Absence of the Commitment Problem for the Otway-Rees Pro-
tocol) The ideal Otway-Rees system SysOR,id perfectly fulﬁlls the property
NoComm, i.e., SysOR,id |=perf NoComm.
Proof. Note ﬁrst that the secret key shared initially between a user and
the trusted third party will never be sent by deﬁnition in case the user is
honest, and it is already known to the adversary when it is ﬁrst used in case
of a dishonest user. The interesting cases are thus the keys generated by the
trusted third party in the protocol sessions.
Let j ≤ size, D[j].type = skse such that D[j] was created by MORT in
Step 2.19, where, with the notation of Algorithm 2, we have y3 = u and y4 = v
for y3, y4 ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If u or v were dishonest, then the adversary would get
a handle for D[j] after MORT ﬁnishes its execution, i.e., in particular before D[j]
has been used for encryption for the ﬁrst time, since the adversary knows the
keys shared between the dishonest users and the trusted third party. If both u
and v are honest, key secrecy then immediately implies that t : D[j].hnd a = ↓
for all t ∈ N, which ﬁnishes the proof. 
6.2 Proof of Real-or-random Secrecy and Computational Consistency
As the ﬁnal step in the overall security proof, we show how to derive cor-
responding secrecy and consistency properties from the proofs in the ideal
setting and the simulatability result of the underlying library. In particular,
we derive cryptographic, real-or-random key secrecy as well as computational
fulﬁllment of the consistency property.
Once we have shown that the considered keys are symbolically secret and
that the commitment problem does not occur for the Otway-Rees protocol,
we can exploit the following key-secrecy preservation theorem:
Theorem 6.2 (Symbolic Key Secrecy Implies Cryptographic Key Secrecy [9])
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Let a polynomial-time honest user H of a structure ({THH}, SH) of the
ideal cryptographic library and a secret-key belief function seckeys for H be
given such that the cryptographic library with this user keeps the keys in
seckeys strictly symbolically secret. Then every polynomial-time conﬁgura-
tion (MˆH, SH,H,A) of the real cryptographic library (with the same user H)
keeps the keys in seckeys cryptographically secret.
It is easy to show that this theorem implies the cryptographic secrecy
part of Theorem 4.5 once the ideal, symbolic part has already been shown:
We have shown in Section 5 that the ideal Otway-Rees protocol keeps the
keys of honest users strictly symbolically secret, i.e., the cryptographic li-
brary with user H∗ denoting the combination of {H} ∪ {MORu | u ∈ H} keeps
the keys in seckeys initiator OR and seckeys responder OR strictly symboli-
cally secret. Hence Theorem 6.2 implies that every polynomial-time con-
ﬁguration (MˆH, SH,H
∗,A) of the real cryptographic library keeps the keys
in seckeys initiator OR and seckeys responder OR cryptographically secret, and
thus that the every polynomial-time conﬁgurations of SysOR,real keeps the ex-
changed keys of honest users cryptographically secret.
We only brieﬂy sketch how to derive ReqConsreal from the the ideal counterpart
since the proofs contains requires slightly more knowledge about the underly-
ing proof of soundness of the cryptographic library [10,8]: One ﬁrst exploits
that the real and ideal consistency properties closely resemble so-called in-
tegrity properties in the sense of [6]. Integrity properties correspond to sets
of traces at the in- and output ports connecting the system to the honest
users, i.e., properties that can be expressed solely via statements about events
at the port set SH; in particular, integrity property hence do not rely on
the state of the underlying machine. Integrity properties are preserved under
simulatability, i.e., they carry over from the ideal to the real system without
any additional work. Formally, the following preservation theorem has been
established in [6].
Theorem 6.3 (Preservation of Integrity Properties (Sketch)) Let two sys-
tems Sys1, Sys2 be given such that Sys1 is at least as secure as Sys2 (written
Sys1 ≥
poly
sec Sys2). Let Req be an integrity property for both Sys1 and Sys2, and
let Sys2 |=
poly Req. Then also Sys1 |=
poly Req.
Note that this theorem would allow us to derive ReqConsreal from its ideal coun-
terparts, provided that we can somehow link the statements involving the state
of the ideal and real cryptographic library, i.e., the statements t1 : D[hndu =
skseu
hnd] = t2 : D[hndv = sksev
hnd and t1 : Du[hndu = skseu
hnd].word = t2 :
Dv[hndv = sksev
hnd].word . If one looks at the underlying proof of soundness of
the cryptographic library, there exists a so-called combined system that links
M. Backes / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 155 (2006) 111–145138
state parts of the real library to state parts of the ideal library. In particu-
lar, we obtain that if the real Otway-Rees protocol is run with an arbitrary
adversary and if we have t1 : D[hndu = skseu
hnd] = t2 : D[hndv = sksev
hnd]
then there always exist an adversary against the ideal Otway-Rees protocol
such that t1 : Du[hndu = skseu
hnd].word = t2 : Dv[hndu = skseu
hnd].word .
Together with the aforementioned integrity preservation theorem, this shows
that the real Otway-Rees protocol computationally fulﬁlls ReqConsreal and hence
ﬁnishes the proof of Theorem 4.5.
7 Conclusion
We have proven the Otway-Rees protocol in the real cryptographic setting via
a deterministic, provably secure abstraction of a real cryptographic library.
Together with composition and preservation theorems from the underlying
model, this library allowed us to perform the actual proof eﬀort in a deter-
ministic setting corresponding to a slightly extended Dolev-Yao model. In
particular, we prove real-or-random secrecy of the exchanged keys, i.e., no
polynomial-time adversary attacking the protocol is able to distinguish fresh,
random keys and keys that are actually exchanged in the protocol. Besides
establishing the cryptographic security of the Otway-Rees protocol, our result
also serves an an exempliﬁcation of the potential of the cryptographic library
and the recent secrecy preservation theorem for symbolic, automated, and
cryptographically sound proofs of security protocols.
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A Proof of the Invariants
A.1 Correct Nonce Owner and Unique Nonce Use
We start with the proof of correct nonce owner.
Proof. [Correct nonce owner ] Let (xhnd, ·, v, j) ∈ Nonceu for u ∈ H, v ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and j ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4}. By construction, this entry has been added to Nonceu by M
OR
u in Step 1.3, Step 3.9,
Step 1.25, or Step 1.37. In the last two cases, the entry (xhnd, ·, v, j−1) respectively (xhnd, ·, v, j−3)
was already contained in Nonceu (for the same handle x
hnd and the same identity v) hence it is
suﬃcient to consider the ﬁrst two cases. In both cases xhnd has been generated by the command
gen nonce() at some time t, input at port inu? of THH. Convention 1 implies x
hnd = ↓, as MORu
would abort otherwise and not add the entry to the set Nonceu. The deﬁnition of gen nonce then
implies D[hndu = x
hnd] = ↓ and D[hndu = x
hnd].type = nonce at time t. Because of Lemma 5.2 this
also holds at all later times t′ > t, which ﬁnishes the proof. 
The following proof of unique nonce use is quite similar.
Proof. [Unique Nonce Use] Assume for contradiction that both x1 := (D[j].hndu , ·, w, ·) ∈ Nonceu
and x2 := (D[j].hndv , ·, w
′, l) ∈ Noncev at some time t. Without loss of generality, let t be the ﬁrst
such time and let x2 ∈ Noncev at time t− 1. By construction, x2 is thus added to Noncev at time
t by Step 1.3, Step 3.9, Step 1.25, or Step 1.37. In the last two cases, the entry (xhnd, ·, w′, l − 1)
respectively (xhnd, ·, w′, l − 3) was already contained in Nonceu (for the same handle x
hnd and the
same identity w′) hence it is suﬃcient to consider the ﬁrst two cases. In both cases, D[j].hndv has
been generated by the command gen nonce() at time t − 1. The deﬁnition of gen nonce implies
that D[j] is a new entry and D[j].hndv its only handle at time t− 1, and thus also at time t. With
correct nonce owner this implies u = v. Further, x2 = (D[j].hndv , ·, w
′, l) is the only entry that is
put into Noncev at times t− 1 and t. Thus also w = w
′. This is a contradiction. 
A.2 Correct List Owner
In the following subsections, we prove correct list owner, nonce secrecy, key secrecy, and nonce-list
secrecy by induction. Hence assume that all three invariants hold at a particular time t in a run of
the system, and we have to show that they still hold at time t + 1.
Proof. [Correct list owner ] Let u, v ∈ H, j ≤ size with D[j].type = list. Let x indi := D[j].arg [i] for
i = 1, 2 and xhnd1,u := D[x
ind
1 ].hndu , and assume that (x
hnd
1,u, ID
hnd
u , v, l) ∈ Nonceu at time t + 1.
The only possibilities to violate the invariant correct list owner are that (1) the entry D[j] is
created at time t+1 or that (2) the handle D[j].hndu is created at time t+1 for an entry D[j] that
already exists at time t or that (3) the entry (xhnd1,u, ID
hnd
u , v, l) is added to Nonceu at time t+1. In
all other cases the invariant holds by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 5.2.
We start with the third case. Assume that (xhnd1,u, ID
hnd
u , v, l) is added to Nonceu at time t + 1.
By construction, this only happens in a transition of MORu in Step 1.3, 3.9, 3.25, and 3.37. However,
in the ﬁrst two subcases, the entry D[x ind1 ] has been generated by the command gen nonce input at
inu? immediately before, hence x
ind
1 cannot be contained as an argument of an entry D[j] at time t.
Formally, this corresponds to the fact that D is well-formed [10]. Since a transition of MORu does not
modify entries in THH, this also holds at time t+1. For the latter two cases, note that Step 3.22 and
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Step 3.29 ensure that (xhnd1,u, ID
hnd
u , v, 2) ∈ Nonceu respectively (x
hnd
1,u, ID
hnd
u , v, 1) ∈ Nonceu already
at time t. Hence the claim follows by induction hypothesis and from the previous two subcases.
For proving the remaining two cases, assume that D[j].hndu is created at time t + 1 for
an already existing entry D[j] or that D[j] is generated at time t + 1. Because both can only
happen in a transition of THH, this implies (x
hnd
1,u, ID
hnd
u , v, l) ∈ Nonceu already at time t, since
transitions of THH cannot modify the set Nonceu. Because of u, v ∈ H, nonce secrecy implies
D[x indi ].hndw = ↓ only if w ∈ {u, v,T}. Lists can only be constructed by the basic command list,
which requires handles to all its elements. More precisely, if w ∈ H ∪ {a,T} creates an entry D[j′]
with D[j′].type = list and (x′1, . . . , x
′
k) := D[j].arg at time t+1 then D[x
′
i].hndw = ↓ for i = 1, . . . , k
already at time t. Applied to the entry D[j], this implies that either u, v, or T have created the
entry D[j].
We now only have to show that the entry D[j] has been created by u in the claimed steps.
This can easily be seen by inspection of Algorithms 1, 2, and 3. We only show it in detail for the
ﬁrst part of the invariant; it can be proven similarly for the second part where the claim about the
session identiﬁer immediately follows from the proof.
Let (xhnd1,u, ID
hnd
u , v, l) ∈ Nonceu for l ∈ {1, 2} and D[x
ind
2 ].type = nonce. By inspection of
Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 and because D[j].type = list, we see that the entry D[j] must have been
created by either MORu or M
OR
v in Step 1.6 if l = 1 or in Step 3.12. (The remaining list generation
commands always have D[x ind2 ].type ∈ {skse, symenc} by construction.) This already implies that
the entry D[j] has not been generated by T. Now assume for contradiction that the entry D[j] has
been generated by MORv . This implies that also the entry D[x
ind
1 ] has been newly generated by the
command gen nonce input at inv?. However, only M
OR
u can add elements to the set Nonceu (it is
the local state of MORu ), but if an entry (x
hnd
1,u, ·, ·, ·) is added to the set Nonceu by M
OR
u , then x
hnd
1,u
has been newly generated by the command gen nonce input by MORu by construction. This implies
(xhnd1,u, ·, ·, ·) ∈ Nonceu at all times, which yields a contradiction to x
hnd
1,u ∈ Nonceu at time t + 1.
Hence D[j] has been created by user u. 
A.3 Nonce Secrecy
Proof. [Nonce secrecy ] Let u, v ∈ H, j ≤ size with x := (D[j].hndu , ID
hnd, v, l) ∈ Nonceu, and
w ∈ (H∪ {a}) \ {u, v} be given. Because of correct nonce owner, we know that D[j].type = nonce.
The invariant could only be aﬀected if (1) x is put into the set Nonceu at time t + 1 or (2) if a
handle for w is added to the entry D[j] at time t + 1.
For proving the ﬁrst case, note that the set Nonceu is only extended by an entry x by M
OR
u
in Steps 1.3 and 3.9 (again the modiﬁcations of Nonceu in Steps 3.25 and 3.37 do not have to be
considered since an entry (D[j].hndu , ID
hnd, v, l− 1) respectively (D[j].hndu , ID
hnd, v, l− 3) already
existed in Nonceu before, which is ensured by the checks in Steps 3.22, 3.29, and 3.34). In both
cases, D[j].hndu has been generated by THH at time t since the command gen nonce was input at
inu? at time t. The deﬁnition of gen nonce immediately implies that D[j].hndw = ↓ at time t if
w = u. Moreover, this also holds at time t + 1 since a transition of MORu does not modify handles
in THH, which ﬁnishes the claim for this case.
For proving the second case, we only have to consider those commands that add handles for
w to entries of type nonce. These are only the commands list proj or adv parse input at inw?,
where adv parse has to be applied to an entry of type list, since only entries of type list can have
arguments which are indices to nonce entries. More precisely, if one of the commands violated the
invariant there would exist an entry D[i] at time t such that D[i].type = list, D[i].hndw = ↓ and
j ∈ (x ind1 , . . . , x
ind
m ) := D[i].arg . However, both commands do not modify the set Nonceu, hence we
have x ∈ Nonceu already at time t. Now nonce secrecy yields D[j].hndw = ↓ at time t and hence
also at all times < t because of Lemma 5.2. This implies that the entry D[i] must have been created
by either u or v, since generating a list presupposes handles for all elements (cf. the previous proof).
Assume without loss of generality that D[i] has been generated by u. By inspection of Algorithms 1
and 3, this immediately implies j = x ind1 , since such handles only occur as ﬁrst element in a list
generation by u. Because of j = D[i].arg [1] and (D[j].hndu , ·, v, ·) ∈ Nonceu at time t, nonce-list
secrecy for the entry D[i] implies that D[i].hndw = ↓ at time t. This yields a contradiction. 
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A.4 Key Secrecy
Proof. [Key Secrecy ] Let j ≤ size, D[j].type = skse such that D[j] was created by MORT in Step 2.19,
where, with the notation of algorithm 2, we have y3 = u and y4 = v for honest u, v. Now the message
output in Step 2.25 maintains the entry D[j] within an encryption with sksehndT,u and one with
sksehndT,v. By assumption, these keys are shared between u and T respectively v and T, and they are
never sent. The deﬁnition of the command sym decrypt implies that only u and T respectively v and
T can get a handle to the entry D[j] out of these encryptions. Such a decryption could only happen
in Steps 3.19 and 3.31 yielding handles l(3)
hnd
respectively l(2)
hnd
. Let y1 := D[hndu = l
(3)hnd ].arg [1],
yhnd1 := D[y1].hndu , and x1 := D[hndu = l
(2)hnd ].arg [2], xhnd1 := D[x1].hndu . In both cases, the
checks in Step 3.22 respectively in Step 3.29 and 3.34 imply (yhnd1 , ID
hnd, w, 2) ∈ Nonceu respectively
(xhnd1 , ID
hnd, w, 1) ∈ Nonceu as otherwise M
OR
u would abort the current transition without updating
its state and without producing any output. Now nonce-list secrecy immediately implies that
D[hndu = l
(2)hnd ].hnd a = D[hndu = l
(3)hnd ].hnd a = ↓. Since u, v, and T only send the entry D[j] as
an argument of D[hndu = l
(2)hnd ] or D[hndu = l
(2)hnd ], we obtain D[j].hnd a = ↓, which ﬁnishes the
proof.

A.5 Nonce-List Secrecy
Proof. [Nonce-list secrecy ] Let u, v ∈ H, j ≤ size with D[j].type = list. Let x indi := D[j].arg [i] and
xhndi,u := D[x
ind
i ].hndu for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, and w ∈ (H∪ {a}) \ {u, v}. Let x
hnd
1,u ∈ Nonceu,v.
We ﬁrst show that the invariant cannot be violated by adding an element (xhndi,u , ID
hnd
u , v, l) to
Nonceu at time t + 1. This can only happen in a transition of M
OR
u in Step 1.3, 3.9, 3.25, or 3.37.
As shown in the proof of correct list owner, in the ﬁrst two cases, we have l ∈ {1, 2} and that the
entry D[x indi ] has been generated by THH immediately before and hence that x
ind
i ∈ D[j].arg for all
entries D[j] that already exist at time t + 1. This also holds for all entries at time t + 1, since the
transition of MORu does not modify entries of THH. This yields a contradiction to x
ind
i = D[j].arg [i].
In the last two cases, Step 3.22 and Step 3.29 ensure that (xhnd1,u, ID
hnd
u , v, 2) ∈ Nonceu respectively
(xhnd1,u, ID
hnd
u , v, 1) ∈ Nonceu already at time t. In all cases, we hence know that (x
hnd
i,u , ID
hnd
u , v, l) ∈
Nonceu for l ∈ {1, 2} already holds at time t.
Part a) of the invariant can only be aﬀected if a handle for w is added to an entry D[j] that
already exists at time t. (Creation of D[j] at time t with a handle for w is impossible as above
because that presupposes handles to all arguments, in contradiction to nonce secrecy.) The only
commands that add new handles for w to existing entries of type list are list proj, sym decrypt,
adv parse, send i, and adv send i applied to an entry D[k] with j ∈ D[k].arg . Nonce-list secrecy
for the entry D[j] at time t then yields D[k].type = enc. Thus the commands list proj, send i,
and adv send i do not have to be considered any further. Moreover, nonce-list secrecy also yields
D[k].arg [1] ∈ {pkseu, pksev}. The secret keys shared between u and T respectively v and T are not
known to w ∈ {u, v,T}, formally D[hndu = skse
hnd
u ].hndw = D[hndv = skse
hnd
v ].hndw = ↓. Hence
the command sym decrypt does not violate the invariant. Finally, the command adv parse applied
to an entry of type symenc with unknown secret key also does not give a handle to the cleartext
list, i.e., to D[k].arg [2], but only outputs its length.
Part b) and c) of the invariant can only be aﬀected if the list entry D[j] is created at time
t + 1. (By well-formedness, the argument entry D[x ind3 ] cannot be created after D[j].) As in Part
a), it can only be created by a party w ∈ {u, v,T} because other parties have no handle to the
nonce argument. Inspection of Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 shows that this can only happen in Steps 1.6
and 3.12, because for all other commands list we have D[x ind3 ].type = data which would violate the
precondition.
• If the creation is in Step 1.6, the preceding Step 1.3 implies (D[x ind1 ].hndw , ID
hnd, w′, 1) ∈ Noncew
for some w′ and some IDhnd and Step 1.4 implies D[x ind3 ].type = data. Thus the precondition
(D[x ind1 ].hndu , ID
hnd, v, 1) ∈ Nonceu and unique nonce use then imply u = w. Thus Steps 1.4, 1.5,
and 1.6 yield D[x ind3 ].arg = (u) and D[x
ind
4 ].arg = (v).
• If the creation is in Step 3.12, the proof is analogous: The preceding Step 3.9 implies
(D[x ind1 ].hndw , ID
hnd, w′, 2) ∈ Noncew for some w
′ and some IDhnd and Step 3.11 implies
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D[x ind3 ].type = data. Then the precondition, Step 3.9, and unique nonce use imply u = w.
Finally, Steps 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 yield D[x ind3 ].arg = (v) and D[x
ind
4 ].arg = (u).
Part d) of the invariant can only be violated if a new entry D[k] is created at time t + 1 with
j ∈ D[k].arg (by Lemma 5.2 and well-formedness). As D[j] already exists at time t, nonce-list
secrecy for D[j] implies D[j].hndw = ↓ for w ∈ {u, v,T} at time t. We can easily see by inspection
of the commands that the new entry D[k] must have been created by one of the commands list and
sym encrypt, since entries newly created by other commands cannot have arguments that are indices
of entries of type list. Since all these commands entered at a port inz? presuppose D[j].hndz = ↓, the
entry D[k] is created by w ∈ {u, v,T} at time t+1. However, the only steps that can create an entry
D[k] with j ∈ D[k].arg (with the properties demanded for the entry D[j]) are Steps 1.7, 3.13, 2.21,
and 2.23. In all these cases, we have D[k].type = symenc. Further, we have D[k].arg [1] = pksew′
where w′ denotes w’s current believed partner. We have to show that w′ ∈ {u, v}.
• Case 1: D[k] is created in Step 1.7. Then our precondition (D[x ind1 ].hndu , ID
hnd
u , v, l) ∈ Nonceu
and (D[x ind1 ].hndw , ID
′hnd
u , w
′, l′) ∈ Noncew for some ID
′hnd
u , l
′ and unique nonce use imply w′ = v.
• Case 2: D[k] is created in Step 3.13. This execution of Algorithm 3 must give l
(3)hnd
2 = ↓ in
Step 3.12, since it would otherwise abort by Convention 1. Let l
(3)
2
ind
:= D[hndw = l
(3)hnd
2 ].ind .
The algorithm further implies D[l
(3)
2
ind
].type = list. Let x0i
ind
:= D[l
(3)
2
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 at
the time of Step 3.12, and let x0
hnd
i,w be the corresponding handles obtained in Step 3.1, 3.8, 3.11,
and 3.10. As the algorithm does not abort in Steps 3.3 and 3.6, we have D[x03
ind
].type = data
and D[x03
ind
].arg = (w′).
Together with the precondition (D[x01
ind
].hndu , ·, v, l) ∈ Nonceu, the entry D[l
(3)
2
ind
] therefore
fulﬁlls the conditions of nonce-list secrecy. This implies D[x02
ind
].arg ∈ {u, v}, and thus w′ ∈
{u, v}.
• Case 3: D[k] is created in Step 2.21 or Step 2.23. As in Case 3, this execution of Algorithm 2
must give l(3)
hnd
= ↓ in Step 2.4 and l(2)
hnd
= ↓ in Step 2.12. We set l(3)
ind
:= D[hndw = l
(3)hnd ].ind
and l(2)
ind
:= D[hndw = l
(2)hnd ].ind , and we have D[l(3)
ind
].type = D[l(2)
ind
].type = list.
Let y0i
ind
:= D[l(3)
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 at the time of Step 2.5, and let y0
hnd
i,w be the handles
obtained in Step 2.5. Let further x0i
ind
:= D[l(2)
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 at the time of Step 2.13,
and let x0
hnd
i,w be the handles obtained in Step 2.13.
As the algorithm does not abort in Steps 2.7 and 2.16, we have D[y03
ind
].type = D[y04
ind
].type =
D[x03
ind
].type = D[x04
ind
].type = data and D[x04
ind
].arg = D[y04
ind
].arg = (w′). Further, the reuse of
x0
hnd
1,w in Step 2.20 implies x
0
1
ind
= x ind1 . Similarly, we obtain y
0
1
ind
= y ind1 because of Step 2.22.
Together with the precondition (D[x ind1 ].hndu , ID
hnd, v, l) ∈ Nonceu, the entry D[l
(3) ind] respec-
tively D[l(2)
ind
] therefore fulﬁlls the condition of nonce-list secrecy. This implies D[y03
ind
].arg ∈
{u, v} respectively D[y03
ind
].arg ∈ {u, v}, and thus w′ ∈ {u, v}.
Hence in all cases we obtained w′ ∈ {u, v}, i.e., the list containing the nonce was indeed encrypted
with the key that one of the intended honest participants shared with the trusted third party. 
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